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The Hague Convention 1980 was welcomed by the international community to resolve the emerging 
issue of international child abduction. The Convention is premised on the assumption that all child 
abduction is inherently harmful. Thus, it is generally in the best interests of children to be returned to 
the country of habitual residence as expediently as possible, restoring the status quo. 
Domestic violence victims do not fall within the typical abduction paradigm which the Convention 
was drafted to remedy. New Zealand courts have adopted a narrow approach to the "grave risk" 
defence, requiring the abducting party to prove that the country of habitual residence cannot 
adequately protect the child. This is rarely established due to the influence of the principle of comity. 
This approach therefore effectively blocks the discretionary inquiry, which only occurs once the 
defence is established, in which the Convention principles can be weighed against the welfare and 
best interests of the individual child, a consideration paramount in both domestic and international 
law. Domestic violence makes it unlikely that return will ever be in the child's welfare and best 
interests. A change in approach is suggested, under which consideration of the adequacy of the 
habitual residence's protection laws becomes a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion. 
This ensures all considerations are given due regard and the safety of young domestic violence victims 
is better assured.  
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to thank 
my superviser, Alberto Costi, for his invaluable guidence and support. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 (the 
Convention) was aimed at resolving the global issue of international child abduction, exacerbated in 
recent times by technological advances in air travel, rising inter-racial marriages and a difficulty in 
adjudicating across geographical borders.1    
As the Convention was a welcomed development, "it has generally been insulated from the 
scholarly and critical examination to which any area of the law should be subjected".2 It is only in 
recent years that the Convention has sparked academic debate.  
This article explores the current approach by New Zealand courts to the "grave risk" exemption 
in cases of domestic violence. New Zealand courts, similarly to other jurisdictions, have adopted a 
narrow approach, requiring the abductor to show that the habitual residence cannot adequately protect 
the child, in order to establish the defence. Due to the principle of comity, which emphasises respect 
for another nation's legislative and judicial jurisdiction, it is rare that courts will make such a finding 
as this may be seen to undermine the principle. Thus, the current approach effectively blocks the latter 
discretionary inquiry which balances Convention purposes and a child's welfare and best interests in 
deciding whether a return order should be made. Whilst this aligns with Convention principles of 
deterrence, speedy return and a focus on forum over merits, victims of domestic violence are different 
to the "stereotypical abductor" the Convention was drafted to deal with, and consequently a different 
approach is needed.  
This article suggests evidence of domestic violence should suffice to establish the "grave risk" 
defence, with examination of the other country's legal system being considered in the exercise of 
discretion. This ensures the welfare and best interests inquiry is given due weight alongside other 
considerations, guaranteeing better protection for victims. The compulsory appointment of a lawyer 
for the child in these situations may also help to safeguard the child's welfare and best interests, 
particularly as undertakings have been largely ineffective.  
The legal framework, including the drafting of the Convention, key purposes and its subsequent 
implementation in New Zealand will firstly be outlined, followed by a discussion of the relationship 
between the Convention and domestic violence. The core part of this article will consider the current 
approach by New Zealand courts in domestic violence cases, with comparison to overseas 
jurisdictions, and the consequent issues with this approach. The final paragraphs suggest an 
adjustment of approach and briefly examine the possible benefits and critiques of such an adjustment.   
  
1  Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1343 UNTS 97 (opened for signature 25 
October 1980, entered into force 1 December 1983) [Hague Convention]. 
2  Miranda Kaye "The Hague Convention and the Flight From Domestic Violence: How Women and Children 
Are Being Returned by Coach and Four" (1999) 13 IJLPF 191 at 192. 
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II LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A Introduction to the Convention 
International child abduction, put simply, refers to situations where a child is abducted (often by 
a parent) from their home country to another state.3 Prior to the Convention, the legal position was 
unsatisfactory.4 Children were abducted to countries with a different legal system, social structure and 
culture, with the physical distance exacerbating issues in locating the child and petitioning for return.5 
The necessity of a global solution and clear legal framework had become urgent by the 1970s, and the 
Convention was subsequently drafted.6  
It was previously unclear which law should govern the dispute, an issue fundamental in private 
international law. The Convention clarified the primary role of the country of habitual residence in 
determining issues of custody.7 This led to the notion that Hague proceedings were therefore focused 
on determining the appropriate forum, rather than a merits inquiry of the case, the latter being best 
suited to the country of habitual residence in accordance with its own social and cultural beliefs. 
The Convention streamlines the return process by providing a procedural framework which 
operates through the Central Authorities of each state.8 The Central Authority, part of New Zealand's 
Ministry of Justice, plays a vital role in securing voluntary return of the child, and if this is 
unachievable, facilitating judicial proceedings for the petitioning party.9 This role may also extend to 
enforcement, as in Butler v Craig, where it was stated "the Central Authority should take prompt steps 
to enforce the return order".10  
  
3  Rebecca Mockett "The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Policy, Issues and Future 
Reforms" (2007) 1 NZLSJ 199 at 199. 
4  David McClean The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, Explanatory Documentation for 
Commonwealth Governments (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1997) at 2. 
5  Hague Conference on Private International Law "Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention" (May 2014) 
<www.hcch.net> at 1 [HCCH]. 
6  Lynda Herring "Taking Away the Pawns: International Parental Abduction and the Hague Convention" (1995) 
20 NCJ Intl L & Com Reg 137 at 138. 
7  HCCH "Explanatory Report" (1982) <www.hcch.net> at 429. 
8  Hague Convention, above n 1, art 7. 
9  Hague Convention, above n 1; and Jennifer Wademan "The Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction: The role of the Central Authority in Court Proceedings" (2008) 6 NZFLJ 105 at 105. 
10  Butler v Craig [2008] NZCA 198, (2008) 28 FRNZ 112 at [63]. 
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As the Convention is not self-executing, its enforceability depends on signatory countries enacting 
implementing legislation.11 There are currently 95 contracting parties to the Convention, including 
New Zealand.12 On 1 March 2017, Pakistan became the 96th signatory to the Convention.  
B Purposes of the Convention 
Article 1 of the Convention outlines the primary objects: securing prompt return of the child, and 
ensuring the rights of custody and access under the laws of one contracting state are effectively 
respected in the other.13 The latter speaks to the principle of comity, reflecting the idea that any dispute 
on the question of a child's custody or residence should take place before the authorities in the country 
of habitual residence.14 Comity may be expanded as referring to "considerations of high international 
politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations".15 Whilst 
a desire to uphold international comity underpins the application of the Convention in this area, it is 
important to keep in mind that comity is implemented solely through courtesy and is not legally 
binding.16 The Convention aims to balance the role of a merits inquiry and the need to respect legal 
relations which may underlie such situations.17  
The summary return mechanism is another central purpose of the Convention, referring to the 
prompt return of the child, aimed at mitigating the effects of the abduction on the child and providing 
a deterrent to any individuals contemplating abduction.18 The general idea is that parents will be less 
likely to abduct if the child will be returned immediately.   
Some have argued that the Convention does acknowledge a child's welfare and best interests; 
however, this is focused on children's interests generally.19 Abduction of a child is presumed to be 
contrary to their welfare as it removes them from a known carer and environment.20 By presuming all 
  
11  Rebecca Rose "Interpretations of the Hague Child Abduction Convention 1980 in New Zealand Since COCA: 
Cause for Concern?" (2008) 16 Wai L Rev 111 at 116. 
12  HCCH "Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Status Table" 
(20 May 2016) <www.hcch.net>. 
13  Hague Convention, above n 1, art 1.  
14  Kaye, above n 2, at 192. 
15  Joel R Paul "Comity in International Law" (1991) 32 Harv Intl LJ at 4. 
16  Malcolm Shaw International Law (7th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014) at 2. 
17  HCCH, above n 7, at 428. 
18  Anne-Marie Hutchinson, Rachel Roberts and Henry Setright International Parental Child Abduction (Jordan 
Publishing, London, 1998) at 4. 
19  Mockett, above n 3, at 207; and Jessica Davies "Untapped Potential: Rethinking the Human Rights Defence 
in International Child Abduction" (2013) 7 NZFLJ 235 at 236. 
20  Pauline Tapp "Welfare of the Child and Abduction" [2007] NZLJ 77 at 80. 
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child abductions are inherently harmful and that summary return is in the best interests of the child, 
the interests of each individual child are in a certain sense sacrificed for the deemed welfare of the 
group.21 This article suggests that domestic violence cases are different. A child who is abducted from 
a situation of domestic violence will likely have different interest and welfare concerns to the 
paradigm group.  
The aforementioned purposes are strongly reflected in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
Convention. 
C Implementation in New Zealand and Framework of a Claim 
The Convention had strong bipartisan support from the New Zealand government, with statements 
in Parliament accentuating the cruelty of child abduction and strong need to amend the inadequate 
current law.22 The New Zealand Law Society also supported the adoption of the Convention, 
expressing the hope that it would bring considerable improvement to an unsatisfactory area of law.23 
The Convention was initially incorporated in the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991 until the Care 
of Children Act 2004 (COCA) became the implementing statute.24   
In the Convention text, the defences are found in different articles. When implemented in New 
Zealand statute, the decision was made to codify the defences in a single section to increase clarity 
and accessibility. Thus what was art 13(b) in the Convention is now found in s 106(1)(c) alongside 
the other defences. The change in format was the major change which occurred in incorporation, with 
the language remaining unchanged.  
While it is relatively easy to establish an application for return of a child under s 105, courts have 
taken a narrow approach to s 106 defences, ensuring prompt return remains the recurrent outcome.25 
Applications for the return of an abducted child can be made if the court is satisfied that the child is 
present in New Zealand, was wrongfully removed in breach of custody rights being exercised at the 
time of removal, and was habitually resident in the other contracting state.26 Under s 105(2), courts 
must order prompt return unless one of the grounds in s 106(1) is established to the satisfaction of the 
court. The permissive language in s 106(1) makes it clear that the court has a residual discretion in 
  
21  Zoran Ponjavic and Veljko Vlaskovic "Space for the Child's Best Interests inside the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction" (2014) 16 Rev Eur L 45 at 51. 
22  (10 April 1991) 513 NZPD 1200–1201.  
23  David Brown New Zealand Law Society Seminar on the Abduction of Children to Overseas Countries (April 
1988).  
24  Care of Children Act 2004, pt 2, subpt 4. 
25  Rose, above n 11, at 122. 
26  Section 105(1). 
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regards to making a return order following the establishment of any of the defences.27 Thus, the 
establishment of a defence does not automatically mean that a return order will not be made.  
The defence at focus in this article, often referred to as the "grave risk" defence, is found in s 
106(1)(c): 
(c)  … there is a grave risk that the child's return — 
(i)  would expose the child to physical or psychological harm; or 
(ii)  would otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation[.] 
The "grave risk" exception is the Convention's most litigated and successfully evoked exception.28 It 
is the defence most often relied on in domestic violence cases, hence its central role in this article.  
D Application and Return Rates 
Since the Convention was signed, there has been a marked increase in return applications, with 
2,321 applications made in 2008, contrasted with only 1,151 applications in 1999.29 Given that one 
of the central aims of the Convention is deterrence, this finding is somewhat disconcerting. New 
Zealand has a judicial return rate of approximately 78 per cent.30 Overall, New Zealand's return rate 
is increasing which is notable as the global return rate has been steadily declining.31 Some have 
praised New Zealand's "long-standing exceptional record of orders for return" but this article suggests 
perhaps success ought instead to be measured by the safety and well-being of abducted children, 
which is not dependent on return orders.32 
III  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CONVENTION 
The plight of domestic violence victims has been recognised as an increasingly important issue in 
recent decades.33 The need to balance expeditious proceedings and the protection of vulnerable 
  
27  Secretary for Justice v HJ [2006] NZSC 97, [2007] 2 NZLR 289 at [139]; and Pauline Tapp "Child Abduction" 
[2008] NZLJ 163 at 163. 
28  Rose, above n 11, at 124. 
29  Nigel V Lowe and Victoria Stephens "Global Trends in the Operation of the 1980 Hague Abduction 
Convention" (2012) 46 Fam LQ 41 at 45. 
30  At 55.  
31  At 56.  
32  Rose, above n 11, at 132. 
33  Mockett, above n 3, at 230. 
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children was recognised as a pressing issue in the most recent Special Commission on the 
Convention.34   
The drafters of the Convention did not turn their minds to the possibility that the abducting party 
may be fleeing domestic violence and resultantly the Convention text omits any reference to domestic 
violence.35 This may be due to domestic violence not being a widely recognised issue during the 
1970s when the Convention was drafted, especially within the context of child abduction. As there is 
no definition of domestic violence in the text, for the purposes of this article, the definition in the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995, meaning any physical, sexual or psychological abuse which occurs 
within a domestic relationship, is useful as it reflects the various forms of abuse which may present.36 
Whilst some academics within this area have focused on the threshold required by the "grave risk" 
defence, this article accepts that domestic violence will generally satisfy the "grave risk" threshold, 
classifiable either as an intolerable situation or physical or psychological harm under s 106(1)(c). 
Thus, the primary barrier for domestic violence victims in successfully resisting a return order is 
proving the inadequacies of the habitual country's legal system. 
The Convention was drafted in accordance with the idea of a stereotypical abductor. The paradigm 
case was of a father who, becoming frustrated due to a lack of access after courts granted sole custody 
to the mother, abducts the child.37 However, there has been a subsequent gendered shift from 
abducting non-custodial fathers to abducting primary-carer mothers, producing a "significant change 
in the motivations for, and dynamics underpinning, international parental child abduction since the 
Convention was drafted".38 One of these motivations is escape from domestic violence. Statistics 
indicate mothers now comprise approximately 69 per cent of abducting parents, with 72 per cent being 
the primary caregivers.39 This shift in the typical offender profile means that the purposes the 
Convention was drafted to achieve are perhaps less relevant. Arguably if a child is not being removed 
from a primary caregiver, as originally premised, prompt return may not be in the best interests of the 
  
34  HCCH "Conclusions and Recommendations and Report of Part I of the Sixth Meeting of the Special 
Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague 
Child Protection Convention" (1–10 June 2011) <www.hcch.net> at 32. 
35  Rhona Schuz The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) 
at 58. 
36  Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 3. 
37  Peter Boshier "The strengths and weaknesses of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction – A New Zealand perspective" (2009) 6 NZFLJ 250 at 252. 
38  Danielle Bozin-Odhiambo "Constructing 'the best interest of the child' legal standard: Hague Child Abduction 
Convention return proceedings and beyond" (2014) 8 NZFLJ 26 at 26. 
39  Lowe and Stephens, above n 29, at 43–44. 
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individual child where the harm resulting from the abduction may be less severe than the pre-
abduction setting if violence is present.  
Alongside the rising awareness of the prevalence and significant harm caused by domestic 
violence, there has been a coinciding rise in the need for greater recognition of children's rights and 
protections. The Convention, as mentioned, focuses on children's interests generally. In recent times, 
due to this rising awareness, there has been a more sustained judicial focus on securing the 
compatibility of the Convention with the individual child's welfare and best interests.40 International 
treaties have codified the importance of children's rights, significantly the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1990 (UNCROC).41 COCA was intended to improve New Zealand's compliance with 
international obligations, particularly UNCROC.42 Thus, New Zealand's domestic legislation stresses 
the fundamental principle that the welfare and best interests of a child should be the paramount 
consideration.43 Clearly, a child's welfare and best interests require protection from all forms of 
domestic violence.  
Global problems have been created by the Convention drafters' omission of domestic violence 
and other contemporary trends from the abduction paradigm.44 Despite the realisation that abductors 
may be fleeing from domestic violence, almost no attention has been given to what the law's response 
to these abductions should be.45 Quillen comments that, whilst there has been a positive trend 
emerging in regard to recognising the unique position of domestic violence in proceedings, it remains 
uncertain whether this progress will continue and subsequently become institutionalised.46 Despite 
domestic violence not being recognised as a pressing issue at the time of drafting, the gendered shift 
in the abduction profile and increasing recognition of the importance of protecting a child's welfare 
and best interests ought to be enough to highlight that the current approach is disjointed from modern 
society. It should not be the case that a domestic violence victim's ability to defeat a return application 
  
40  John Caldwell "Child Abduction Cases: Evaluating Risks to the Child and the Convention" (2008) 23 NZULR 
161 at 161. 
41  Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into 
force 2 September 1990), art 3.  
42  (9 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16715.  
43  Care of Children Act 2004, s 4(1). 
44  Rose, above n 11, at 128. 
45  Merle H Weiner "International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence" (2000) 69 Fordham 
L Rev 593 at 632. 
46  Brian Quillen "The New Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic Violence Victims and Their 
Treatment under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction" (2014) 29 
Texas Intl LJ 621 at 622. 
 THE NEW ZEALAND COURTS' APPROACH TO THE "GRAVE RISK" EXCEPTION FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 89 
rests on fortuity and the judge's sympathy, rather than any principled rule of law.47 Domestic violence 
is an issue which continues to permeate many aspects of social life, including child abduction, and 
cannot be adequately addressed until it is acknowledged as a problem requiring a unique approach, 
different from the mischief originally targeted by the Convention.  
IV CURRENT APPROACH BY NEW ZEALAND COURTS AND 
OVERSEAS JURISDICTIONS TO THE "GRAVE RISK" 
DEFENCE 
A Approach by New Zealand Courts 
Although every situation of international child abduction is factually distinct, the approach by 
New Zealand courts in situations involving domestic violence is analogous across cases.  
Though not explicitly stated in the Convention, it is judicially settled in New Zealand that the 
requisite grave risk in s 106(1)(c) must be associated with the risk of return of the child to the home 
country rather than return to the other parent.48 Therefore, in order to establish the "grave risk" 
exception, the abducting party must establish that the habitual residence is incapable of protecting the 
child from future harm.49 The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in A v A, one of the leading 
cases in this area, noted that where a system of law of the country of habitual residence makes the 
best interests of the child paramount and provides mechanisms by which the best interests of the child 
can be protected, it is for the courts of that country, and not the country to which the child has been 
abducted, to determine their best interests.50 The High Court recently confirmed that this remains an 
accurate statement of New Zealand law, adding that the establishment of this defence is not an easy 
task.51 The operation of the principle of comity constrains judges from allowing the defence in 
situations of domestic violence as it is seen to be saying the judicial system of the habitual residence 
is unable to protect the child on return.52  
The narrow approach of New Zealand courts to the "grave risk" defence can be illustrated by a 
number of recent cases. Venning J in ASM v DPM stressed that in order to establish the "grave risk" 
defence, the father needed to show both a risk of harm and that the courts in Bulgaria would not 
  
47  Weiner, above n 45, at 599. 
48  HJ v Secretary for Justice [Habitual residence] [2006] NZFLR 1005 (CA) at [31]; Caldwell, above n 40, at 
176; and Margaret Casey and Lex de Jong New Zealand Law Society Seminar on the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (March 1995) at 17. 
49  Peter Boshier "Care and protection of children: New Zealand and Australian experience of cross-border 
cooperation" (2005) 5 NZFLJ 63 at 68. 
50  A v A [1996] NZFLR 529 (CA) at 536. 
51  Mikova v Tova [2016] NZHC 1983 at [39]. 
52  Mockett, above n 3, at 208. 
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protect the proper interests and welfare of A.53 Venning J went on to suggest that the court must 
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Bulgaria, as a contracting state to the 
Convention, has a family law system capable of protecting children.54 Thus, there appears to be a 
presumption that contracting states will have adequate legal systems to protect children, further 
restricting the defence and making the task of establishing it even more insurmountable for the 
abductor. Dreadman v Loche, drawing on HJ v Secretary for Justice [Habitual Residence] and A v A, 
outlined key principles which should be considered in these types of cases.55 The Convention is 
concerned with the appropriate forum for determining the best interests of the child, with focus on the 
situation of the child and not the abductor.56 The person seeking to rely on the defence must satisfy 
the court that return to the country will threaten the child's safety because protection cannot be 
provided for the child upon return.57 Such considerations are deliberated against a framework which 
strongly endorses return.58 
It is only after the defence is established that the court will weigh all relevant factors to determine 
whether to exercise its residual discretion and order return. When the discretionary inquiry arises, 
courts weigh the Convention purposes (prompt return being in the general best interests of the child, 
deterrence and comity between contracting states) alongside the circumstances of the case which 
established the defence, and the wider consideration of a child's rights and welfare. This approach was 
confirmed by the majority of the Supreme Court in Secretary for Justice v HJ.59 Whilst this case 
focused on the s 106(1)(a) "settled" defence, its approach to the exercise of discretion was adopted 
with respect to the "grave risk" exception by the Court of Appeal in Smith v Adams, which further 
emphasised that it would be difficult to envisage a situation in which the "grave risk" defence was 
established yet Convention policy outweighed the interests of the child.60 Whilst these cases indicate 
the willingness of courts to engage in a welfare and best interests inquiry, the abductor must 
successfully establish s 106(1)(c), which acts as a precursor to the discretion exercise. If the abductor 
cannot show the country of habitual residence is incapable of protecting the child upon return, the 
welfare and best interest of the child will not even be considered. 
  
53  ASM v DPM [2016] NZHC 137, [2016] NZFLR 747 at [20]. 
54  At [32]. 
55  Dreadman v Loche [2015] NZFC 3002. 
56  At [55]. 
57  At [55]. 
58  S v S [1999] NZFLR 641 (CA) at [9]. 
59  Secretary for Justice v HJ, above n 27, at [68]; and Tapp "Child Abduction", above n 27, at 164. 
60  Smith v Adam [2007] NZFLR 447 (CA) at [13]–[14]. 
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We can see that incompatibility exists between promoting comity between contracting states on 
the one hand, and on the other, the need to adequately protect a child by assessing the individual 
child's best interests during proceedings. The narrow focus on adequacy of a habitual residence's child 
protection laws effectively blocks the discretionary inquiry and this incompatibility is most often 
resolved in favour of facilitating comity.61  
B Overseas Approaches 
Whilst generally analogous, other jurisdictions are beginning to recognise the central role child 
protection and the interests inquiry should play in proceedings. A possible reason for this may be the 
impact of UNCROC, or perhaps a greater judicial willingness to interpret and apply the law in a 
manner consistent with prioritising protection. 
Australian judges assess the habitual residence's child protection laws, considering whether 
protective legislation in the requesting state is functioning and implemented in practice, not just in 
theory.62 In some respects, this may be seen to go beyond the New Zealand approach, which in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, seems to presume other contracting states will have adequate 
child protection laws. In DP v Commonwealth Central Authority the majority rejected the 
development of worldwide judicial authorities, calling for the defence to be narrowly construed.63 
Bozin has attempted to explain this departure by suggesting that in Australia, whilst the Family Court 
continues to apply a restrictive interpretation of the "grave risk" defence, the High Court has been 
seen in some cases to prefer a broader interpretation, better balancing the considerations of comity 
and the welfare of the individual child.64  
England has also adopted a comparative approach. In Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody 
Appeal), the Supreme Court considered that, where allegations of domestic violence are made, courts 
firstly inquire whether a grave risk exists and, secondly, how the child will be protected from this risk, 
considering the protection mechanisms in the habitual residence.65 However, it was acknowledged in 
this decision that tension exists between "the inability of the court to resolve factual disputes between 
the parties and the risks that the child will face if the allegations are in fact true".66 In recent times, 
the English judiciary has acknowledged that the need for swift return under the Convention must be 
  
61  Bozin-Odhiambo, above n 38, at 27. 
62  HCCH, above n 34, at 34. 
63  DP v Commonwealth Central Authority [2001] HCA 39 at [155]. 
64  Danielle Bozin "The Hague Child Abduction Convention's Grave Risk of Harm Exception: Traversing the 
Tightrope and Maintaining Balance between Comity and the Best Interests of the Child" (2016) 35 U Tas L 
Rev 24 at 24. 
65  Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144 at [36]. 
66  At [36]. 
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subject to considerable qualifications, with increasing recognition that the objective of prompt return 
must not be allowed to outweigh the best interests of the child.67 Baroness Hale remarked in Re D 
that it is inconceivable that a court which reached the conclusion there was a grave risk would 
nevertheless return the child to face that fate.68 The House of Lords has stressed it was not the policy 
of the Convention that children should be put at serious risk of harm.69 Perhaps England is beginning 
to recognise the flaws in the current approach and the importance of prioritising protection. 
Promisingly, the passage by Baroness Hale was recently cited as being accepted by counsel in the 
2016 New Zealand case of KN v CN.70  
The Canadian judiciary has expressed similar dissatisfaction with the narrow approach, though it 
continues to follow an approach comparable to New Zealand's. Indication of dissatisfaction may be 
illustrated by the early case of Pollastro v Pollastro in which the Ontario Court of Appeal declined 
an order to return a six-month-old child to California due to evidence of domestic abuse, despite the 
child herself not being physically harmed, as the court found the child's interests were "inextricably 
tied to her [mother's] psychological and physical security".71 There seems to be a growing awareness 
of the different forms of abuse which may harm children and a subsequent recognition of this by some 
jurisdictions. One of the aforementioned Dreadman v Locke principles states the focus ought to be on 
the situation of the child and not the abducting parent, but perhaps a wider interpretation of abuse as 
witnessed in Canada would be more in line with the understanding of domestic violence as presenting 
in both physical and psychological forms.  
The United States has taken a somewhat different approach, giving more explicit domestic 
recognition to the plight of domestic violence victims, with Congress passing the International 
Parental Kidnapping Crime Act 1993 (IPKCA). This Act makes it a felony to remove or retain a child 
under 16 with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights. This differs from the Convention 
as it provides a specific defence for parties fleeing from domestic violence.72 However, it has been 
stressed that whilst IPKCA provides a criminal remedy in international abduction cases, it is not 
intended to detract from the operation of the Convention.73 Courts continue to be explicit in their 
reluctance to use the defence, and to link domestic violence with a grave risk of harm, despite this 
  
67  Adrian Briggs Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 987. 
68  Re D (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619 at [55]. 
69  Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288 at [45]. 
70  KN v CN [2016] NZHC 2049 at [29]. 
71  Pollastro v Pollastro (1999) 43 OR (3d) 485 (ONCA) at [34]. 
72  International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act 18 USC § 1204(c)(2). 
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running counter to the weight of social science research.74 Ultimately, United States court decisions 
accord with international precedent, realising the need to respect the jurisdictional authority of other 
signatory countries in order to best uphold the Convention purposes.75  
In an article contrasting the implementation of the Convention in the United States and Japan, the 
authors noted the most significant difference between the policies was in their recognition of domestic 
violence.76 Whilst the United States, similarly to other Commonwealth countries, fails to expressly 
give weight to domestic violence outside of the IPKCA, Japan's Convention implementation law 
affirms domestic violence as a factor which must be evaluated as a potential risk in proceedings.77 A 
possible reason for this approach may be that Japan signed the Convention in 2013, during a decade 
in which the plight of domestic violence victims has been both recognised and prioritised as an 
important societal issue, a pivotal difference from when the Convention was initially signed some 
three decades prior by New Zealand, the United States, Canada and Australia. 
Consideration of other jurisdictions may be seen as allowing some scope for New Zealand to 
reconsider its current interpretation and application of the Convention. As consistency is of central 
importance when applying international agreements, it is promising to see other Convention states 
beginning to recognise the importance of prioritising protection, rather than strictly enforcing prompt 
return in domestic violence situations, where such Convention purposes are of lesser significance.  
V ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT NEW ZEALAND APPROACH 
A Example of Application 
The recent High Court case of Red v Red illustrates the current approach by New Zealand courts. 
The mother abducted the children to New Zealand, and the father filed Hague proceedings, alongside 
filing for custody on the child's return.78 The mother argued that returning the children would expose 
them to a grave risk, as she and the children, especially the eldest child W, were subject to serious 
physical and psychological abuse, including assault with a taser and W's arm being broken, 
culminating in an interim restraining order.79 In the Family Court, Judge Turner ordered return as 
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there was limited evidence to support the mother's allegations, and the Australian legal system 
considers a child's welfare and best interests to be paramount, offering a variety of welfare and 
statutory agencies which would protect the mother and children upon return.80 Expert evidence 
obtained by the mother in New Zealand strongly opposed return to Australia, highlighting the risk 
that this might trigger PTSD symptomatology and self-harm behaviour in W.81 Nation J, however, 
agreed with Judge Turner and ordered return of the children on appeal.82  
At first blush, the "grave risk" defence appears a useful mechanism for domestic violence victims. 
However, in practice, the narrow approach by courts allows allegations of serious violence to be 
marginalised in favour of the inquiry into the adequacy of a habitual residence's protection laws. 
B Protection of Victims 
Simply because a country has protection laws in place does not mean domestic violence victims 
are not at risk of harm if a return order is made. The current approach of New Zealand courts fails to 
recognise this. 
The courts should not limit an inquiry to the protection offered by the country of habitual 
residence, but ought also consider the lethality of the batterer.83 If a woman leaves a violent partner, 
she and the children remain vulnerable to stalking, assault and continued psychological abuse.84 
Research indicates victims of domestic violence are most vulnerable in the period after leaving an 
abusive partner, and in 23 per cent of domestic violence homicides, protection or restraining orders 
were in place.85 The Australian Law Commission commented that bringing return proceedings under 
the Convention may in and of itself be a form of abuse, as abusers misuse the Convention to exercise 
continued control over partners and children.86 Fisher J in S v S observed that circumstances may arise 
where the habitual residence is incapable of protecting the child as the requesting parent is so 
dangerous that even suitably warned state agents are unable to assure sufficient protection.87 Whilst 
the use of undertakings is increasing in domestic violence cases, courts cannot guarantee 
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compliance.88 Undertakings in this context are voluntary commitments by the petitioner to protect the 
child or mother upon return to the other country, and courts sometimes use these as a precondition for 
the return of the child.89 They are arguably ineffective as they are both unenforceable in the country 
of habitual residence and rarely implemented, with one study illustrating that 67 per cent of 
undertakings were not implemented following the child's return.90 No matter the protection promised, 
abusers may breach protection or restraining orders and the child may remain in danger due to physical 
proximity with the abusing parent.91 Geographic distance may be the only assured avenue to diminish 
the likelihood of future harm.92 There is an issue of the abusers following victims overseas, thus 
avenues of limiting this risk ought to be considered.  
Kaye argues that a court ordering return due to a finding that the habitual residence has adequate 
protection laws would seem particularly ironic to those women who have fled the country precisely 
because the courts and community failed to take necessary steps to protect them from abuse or hold 
the abuser accountable in the first place.93  
Return to a habitual residence may cause further psychological damage to children.94 While a 
country may be able to protect a child from explicit physical risks, the authorities lack the "potent 
weaponry against deep-seated psychological harm occasioned by return to the country in which the 
sexual or physical violence is alleged to have occurred".95 The "grave risk" defence was established 
in Coates v Bowden, as whilst Australian authorities could keep the children safe, they could not 
absolve their anxiety about returning, especially as the father sought contact with the children.96 Such 
anxiety and stress associated with return may only be avoided by a non-return order. 
The reality is that no legal system can ever fully protect women and children from violence.97 
Once the truth of this statement is realised, it becomes clear that New Zealand's current approach to 
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the "grave risk" defence, focused on the mere presence of protection mechanisms, will not adequately 
protect victims of domestic violence. 
C Authority and Convention Purposes 
Judge Ellis has stated there is simply nothing in the Convention which suggests the defences 
should be applied in such a reluctant or restrictive way.98 The adoption of this narrow approach is 
especially surprising in these cases, as the background to the child's abduction is far removed from 
the type of mischief targeted by Convention drafters.99 In situations where the abducting parent is 
fleeing from domestic violence, the purposes of the Convention become significantly less relevant.  
Kaye commented that the "[r]isks of harm and trauma to the child will vary depending on the 
methods, motive and character of the abductor."100 The summary return mechanism operates on two 
key assumptions: first, that summary return is in the best interests of the child; and secondly, that all 
child abduction is harmful.101 By requiring the abducting party to show that the habitual residence 
lacks the ability to adequately protect the child on return, the court is effectively reinforcing the belief 
that all child abduction is harmful and speedy return is the best option. In cases of domestic violence, 
the harm caused by the abduction is likely inconsequential in comparison to the abuse which occurred 
in the country of habitual residence. Logic suggests that a child secure in the knowledge that they will 
not be forced to return to the place of abuse will inhabit a different psychological profile after 
abduction than a child abducted from a primary caregiver and forced to live underground.102 A child's 
individual best interests in domestic violence situations will likely be best met by declining to order 
return, countering Convention purposes.  
The Supreme Court, in Secretary for Justice v HJ, whilst discussing the "settled" defence in s 
106(1)(a), reasoned that because deterrence is no longer possible at this stage of the proceedings, the 
welfare of the child should be a starting point and the most important factor in the exercise of 
discretion, thus giving greater weight to the individual child.103 This statement may be analogised to 
the "grave risk" defence as, similarly, goals of deterrence are no longer of vital importance. If women 
stay in an abusive situation, deterred by the potential application of the Convention, then the 
Convention's underlying goal of protecting children will be undermined. In A v A, the mother took the 
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child into hiding as she was so concerned for the welfare of the child if the return order was made.104 
The mother's actions illustrate a lack of faith in the judicial system and its ability to protect vulnerable 
members of society. The Convention does not seem to deter parties in these situations. 
Domestic violence cases should not be forced uneasily into the paradigm abduction framework 
which the Convention was drafted to remedy. Purposes of limited relevance to domestic violence 
cases should not be relied on to uphold the status quo.   
D Procedural Unfairness 
King commented that, procedurally, applicants for, and parties opposing, return of the child are 
treated unequally in a number of significant respects.105 Although this was in response to United 
Kingdom proceedings, the similarity in approaches means the same procedural difficulties are likely 
faced by New Zealand applicants.  
The return proceedings are likely fair in the case of the typical abduction paradigm. However, in 
"grave risk" cases, the current approach by New Zealand courts places an unfair onus on the abductor. 
After proving the grave risk produced by the domestic violence, abductors must then "confront the 
even more challenging task of proving the practical inadequacy of the laws of the other country, all 
in a context where courts readily trust the sufficiency of another governments laws as they appear on 
paper".106 This is a near impossible burden to discharge, thus placing the abductor at a distinct 
procedural disadvantage to the party petitioning for return.  
The policy of expediency does not readily accommodate expert reports, oral evidence or counsel 
for the child.107 This can make the establishment of s 106(1)(c) even more difficult. Evidence is 
increasingly important in these cases as the pattern of violence is crucial to understanding the potential 
future risk posed by the abuser.108 Such evidence may be given adequate consideration in the 
discretionary stage of the inquiry, but cases rarely proceed to this. Evidence helping to establish an 
abductor's case is overlooked in favour of prompt return. 
Due to geographical closeness, a majority of cases of international child abduction occur between 
Australia and New Zealand. As New Zealand courts have the highest respect for the courts of Australia 
and would be very unlikely to critique the latter's child protection laws, the "grave risk" defence is 
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rendered essentially redundant in situations involving these countries.109 New Zealand courts are 
often too willing to trust the courts of the requesting state to protect the child and, consequently, there 
is little the abductor can do to contest return.  
E Welfare and Best Interests of the Child Inquiry 
Generally, there were high levels of support in Parliament for the introduction of the Convention. 
However concern was raised that the courts' discretion may not be wide enough to prevent a court 
from returning a child to a detrimental situation, especially given the fundamental principle in New 
Zealand law that the welfare of the child is paramount.110  
Section 4 of COCA outlines that a child's welfare and best interests ought to be a paramount 
consideration, but s 4(4) stresses this paramountcy does not limit the Convention provisions, 
seemingly mitigating the importance of a child's welfare and best interests in these inquiries. It seems 
strange to rely on another country to prioritise a child's welfare and best interests whilst we allow it 
to be overtly excluded from our own Convention inquiries. By considering children an 
indistinguishable group and dictating that summary return is in their best interest, there is little scope 
for consideration of the individual child. 
Caldwell has suggested that the future viability and public acceptance of the Convention could be 
placed at risk if a more child-centred approach is not adopted.111 This is relevant due to the increased 
international and domestic awareness of the importance of children's rights. It cannot be allowable to 
treat a child as a legal object, so that they become invisible inside the mechanisms of the 
Convention.112  
There is a key tension between the summary return mechanism, which favours the perceived 
general interests of the child, and the fundamental principle in New Zealand family law and art 3 of 
UNCROC that the welfare of the child should be paramount.113 Courts are beginning to recognise the 
importance of considering the welfare and best interests inquiry, however, if this is not considered 
until the latter discretionary exercise, then the child's interests are not the paramount consideration. 
Due regard may not even be given to the child's welfare and best interests as the current approach by 
New Zealand Courts in establishing the "grave risk" defence in the first place effectively blocks the 
latter discretionary stage. 
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VI SUGGESTED CHANGES IN APPROACH 
This section offers suggested changes to the current approach by reconsidering the structure of 
the inquiry, attempting to mitigate some of the aforementioned issues.  
A Establishment of the "Grave Risk" Defence and the Exercise of 
Discretion 
The Convention provides a legislative framework for, and streamlining of, the return process, 
which can facilitate expedient return. However, these benefits are most notably witnessed in those 
paradigm cases the Convention was drafted to resolve. Domestic violence victims do not fit into this 
typical abduction paradigm, making the current approach unsatisfactory.  
Tapp posed the question of whether a Convention premised on conditions and legal concepts 
which existed in 1980 can remain viable in the 21st century.114 An entire reworking of the Convention 
text would be problematic on a range of levels, requiring compromise by the international community. 
A better approach might be a reconsideration of the way we currently interpret and implement the 
Convention.  Changes should occur within the current framework via changing practices, thus 
avoiding having to develop a new Convention when the existing one generally works well in paradigm 
cases. Mockett commented that the best way to conform to UNCROC and fundamental family law 
principles is for courts to move towards a more flexible approach which would allow for situations in 
which an order for return can be refused where it is clearly not in the best interests of the child.115  
If the court accepts that evidence of domestic violence meets the "grave risk" threshold, then s 
106(1)(c) should be established. The consideration into the adequacy of another country's child 
protection laws and mechanisms should not be another hurdle for the abductor to prove in establishing 
the defence. Rather, it is a factor which should be considered in the exercise of discretion alongside 
Convention principles, and the child's welfare and best interests. Courts should avoid presuming 
contracting states have adequate protection laws and instead, consider evidence as to whether 
protection can be assured in reality. If the adequacy inquiry occurs in the exercise of discretion, Courts 
have the scope to consider a range of evidence such as the history of the abuser and abuse, prior 
breaches of protection orders, and the tangible risk of harm to the child which return may generate.  
In recent decades, New Zealand courts have made comments which appear to hint at a shift in 
approach, or at the very least, dissatisfaction with the current approach. The Court of Appeal in HJ v 
Secretary for Justice remarked that it had no difficulty with the proposition that the grave risk 
exception could be invoked to refuse a child's return to a country possessing a perfectly adequate legal 
system.116 Whilst the current approach blocks this possibility, this statement seems to leave the gate 
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open for a wider interpretation of the defence. In El Sayad v Secretary for Justice the Judge stated that 
the limitation of the "grave risk" exception that harm must arise out of return to a country appears to 
misread the Convention when a wider interpretation is more appropriate.117 Glazebrook J in Punter v 
Secretary for Justice noted that evolution in construction is entirely permissible under art 31(3)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which allows for changes in interpretation to 
adequately reflect current state practice.118 If states fully consented to the Convention in first instance 
via signing and ratification, they ought to consent to subsequent developments to ensure the 
Convention continues to achieve its primary goal; the protection of children. Mockett also referred to 
the Vienna Convention as providing the opportunity to adapt the current application of the Convention 
to meet the changing context of child abduction.119 However, she stressed that a "balance must be 
struck between allowing the Convention to respond to changes in society and ensuring the essential 
elements of the Convention remain functional".120 Due to societal changes, reflective of the changing 
abduction paradigm and increasing emphasis on the importance of the protection of domestic violence 
victims and rights of the child, variation in the approach to the "grave risk" defence should be 
justifiable. This is particularly so as the change in gender dynamics underpinning abductions has 
impacted upon the effectiveness of the Convention's exceptions to return.121 The shift in interpretation 
of overseas contracting states, as discussed, seems to indicate practice is changing. Indeed the New 
Zealand Law Society remarks there seems to be a softening of judicial interpretation of the Convention 
principles in cases where domestic violence is raised.122 
A shift in practice in the way the courts currently implement the defence is needed and the 
opportunity for a reinterpretation is provided by the Vienna Convention, alongside evidence of 
dissatisfaction by domestic and international courts in some cases with the current approach. The key 
barrier for domestic violence victims currently is establishing the habitual residence has inadequate 
protection laws. Once the necessity to show this is removed from the establishment of the "grave risk" 
defence, and shifted into the discretionary inquiry (thus still given due consideration), the protection 
of victims will be better safeguarded.  
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B Appointment of a Lawyer for the Child 
The compulsory appointment of a lawyer for the child in Convention proceedings may act as 
another means by which the child's welfare, best interests and protection can be promoted. 
Pitman comments that it is disconcerting the Convention neither requires nor suggests the 
appointment of a lawyer for the child.123 This is especially troubling in cases evoking the "grave risk" 
exemption where a child's welfare and best interests are at risk. Concern has been expressed at the 
practical implications of giving children separate representation and the delays and costs this may 
entail, and it is thus thought best to be confined to exceptional cases.124 However, as has been 
illustrated, Convention purposes such as speed and deterrence are of limited applicability in cases 
involving domestic violence. Under COCA, a lawyer may be appointed to represent a child in 
proceedings under s 7. However, this is not compulsory; instead it is limited to situations where the 
judge has concerns for a child's safety or well-being and considers such an appointment necessary. 
Family Court guidelines have recommended the appointment of a lawyer for the child in any case 
where a s 106 defence is raised unless the Court is satisfied that the appointment would serve no useful 
purpose. Judges must also consider the interplay with expert reports, Central Authority functions and 
importance of speedy proceedings.125 There is the possibility for lawyers to be involved, but this is 
not routinely implemented in practice.  
It would be encouraging to see the compulsory appointment of a lawyer for the child in 
Convention proceedings where domestic violence allegations are raised. Alongside the 
reconceptualisation of factors to be considered in establishing the "grave risk" defence, this is another 
potentially valuable mechanism to ensure the paramountcy of a child's welfare and best interests. 
VII BENEFITS AND CRITIQUES OF THE SUGGESTED 
CHANGES IN APPROACH 
The proposed shift of the position of the adequacy inquiry into the exercise of discretion and 
compulsory appointment of lawyer for the child in all cases involving domestic violence allegations 
will help to mitigate the aforementioned issues with the current approach. It is also useful to briefly 
consider possible critiques this shift may attract and how these may be justified or mitigated.  
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A Protection of Victims 
The suggested approach offers better protection for victims. Close physical proximity created by 
the return order puts children at risk of both physical and psychological abuse. Moreover, if the abuser 
has a history of breaching protection orders, it is impossible for the habitual residence to guarantee 
the safety of victims. Even if harm is not to the child directly, the effects of emotional abuse on 
children witnessing family violence are well documented.126 Rather than a limited inquiry, the 
meaningful test should be to inquire whether the children are safe in fact.127  
Whilst the grave risk defence is difficult to establish, it has been argued this is justified as the 
taking parent, if concerned for the child's well-being, ought to and should have raised concerns in the 
child's country of habitual residence. However some parents may have already made numerous 
complaints, and others may fear repercussions if disclosure is made. These parents abduct the child 
because they honestly believe the habitual residence is unable to offer protection. 
At its heart, the Convention aims to protect children. Since the Convention was enacted, the 
strength of the concern for the best interests of the child has formidably increased, thus increasing the 
space for national authorities to interpret the exemptions more flexibly and widely in line with this.128 
A wider approach allows for greater consistency with international and domestic child-centred law, 
promoting the paramountcy of a child's welfare and best interests.  The adequacy consideration will 
occur alongside the welfare and best interests inquiry rather than acting as a prerequisite. A child 
should not be returned where it is clear that return will cause harm, does not provide any benefit to 
the child, and is clearly not in their welfare and best interests.129  
UNCROC is one of the most universally accepted human rights documents in history, ratified by 
197 countries (including New Zealand in 1993), hence placing children at the focus of the spread of 
human rights generally.130 UNCROC is guided by principles of provision, participation and 
protection, with the best interests of the child a paramount consideration under art 3(1). This 
paramountcy principle is echoed in s 4 of COCA, and when considering a welfare and best interests 
inquiry within this legislation, s 5 principles should be considered. The majority of the Supreme Court 
in Kacem v Bashir stressed that there should be no weighing of these principles, with the exception 
of s 5(a). Parliament used the language that courts must protect a child from all forms of violence from 
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all persons including members of a child's family.131 This suggests the protection of children is of the 
utmost importance in the welfare and best interests inquiry. The shift of inquiry ensures that this 
consideration is given due weight, better upholding domestic and international law, and in cases where 
it is clearly not in the child's welfare and best interests for a return order to be granted, their protection 
will be ensured. 
B Evidential Issues 
The suggested approach can help to mitigate evidential issues. Under the current approach, it is 
rare that the abducting party will be able to prove that the habitual residence lacks adequate protection 
laws, thus rarely allowing for the invocation of the wider discretionary stage. The issue of grave risk 
is fact-intensive and appropriate evidence will need to be presented as to the nature of alleged harm 
and ability of the state to alleviate this.132 Once rebutting the presumption that Convention parties 
have adequate protection laws is no longer necessary to establish the defence, abductors may focus 
on proving the violence alleged and the subsequent real risk of future harm. The suggested shift in 
approach helps to ensure that the Convention is not another obstacle for women seeking to escape 
abusive situations.133   
A potential critique is that the relaxing of the evidentiary burden on the abducting party may result 
in taking parents raising domestic violence allegations as a way to circumvent international relocation 
procedures, generally intended to take place in the state of the child's habitual residence.134 Article 19 
of the Convention reflects this concern, stating that decisions concerning return shall not be taken to 
be a determination on the merits of any custody issue. Individuals who voluntarily choose to live in a 
country should be held to have accepted that country's legal system for any contingencies that may 
arise.135  
Boshier argues that, whilst the summary nature of the Convention dominates, it does not prevent 
a welfare inquiry; rather, it determines in a timely fashion the contracting state in which such an 
inquiry should take place.136 Domestic violence cases are of a different nature to paradigm 
Convention cases and once abuse is substantiated, a welfare inquiry is necessary to determine the 
result which will best protect victims. If care is taken in ensuring allegations are verified, and the 
  
131  Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [22]. 
132  Caldwell, above n 40, at 186. 
133  Weiner, above n 45, at 600. 
134  HCCH, above n 34, at 34. 
135  Weiner, above n 45, at 646. 
136  Boshier, above n 37, at 251. 
104 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
suggested change in approach allowing for a wider welfare inquiry is limited to these cases, this issue 
should be alleviated.  
C Convention Purposes 
1 Comity 
Whilst the suggested changes in approach allow for wider considerations, it has been stressed that 
any expansion of the "grave risk" defence must carefully be balanced with the Convention's 
fundamental aim of international comity.137  
Potential implications for comity may arise due to a finding that a habitual residence does not 
have adequate child protection laws. Any such finding of official ineptitude or incompetence would 
carry with it the potential to create considerable offence and would accordingly need to be undertaken 
with the utmost delicacy and sensitivity.138 Arguably, the suggested approach is more sympathetic to 
comity. Rather than requiring courts to find a country cannot adequately protect a child in order to 
establish s 106(1)(c), this factor is given due consideration alongside other factors. Courts need not 
critique the habitual residence outright. Whilst the change in approach mitigates the role of the 
contracting state in proceedings, ensuring the protection of domestic violence victims should be 
paramount. 
The focus should be on the abuser and their history of violence, because as mentioned, no state 
can guarantee safety. Protection in fact should be crucial. As judges in both the requesting and 
requested state will inevitably share the same instinct to protect the child, a more child-centred 
understanding of the defence can be expected to occasion little judicial affront.139  
2 Deterrence  
In order for the Convention to work, signatory countries must hold fast to the primary objective 
of immediate return of children wrongfully removed, as anything less would obliterate the underlying 
intent and purposes of the Convention, notably deterrence.140  
There are several issues with deterrence and other Convention goals being used to justify retaining 
the status quo. Tapp comments that the Convention is not an effective deterrent as few people act 
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entirely rationally under stress.141 Where a violent relationship breaks down, people are more likely 
to base their actions on their emotional needs and protection of their children, rather than on strict 
conformity with the law. Deterrence assumes that discouraging international child abduction is a 
categorically desirable goal, however the change in the atypical abduction scenario suggests this is no 
longer the case.142 The shift in approach may lengthen proceedings, mitigating administrative 
efficiency, yet this is arguably justifiable as it will be limited to cases involving allegations of domestic 
violence. The goal of child safety, interwoven into the fabric of the "grave risk" defence, must patently 
trump the more general Convention goals of deterrence and speedy return, with courts refraining from 
getting preoccupied by the need to make an example of the parent's behaviour.143  
3 Merits Inquiry 
Overlapping with comity, the Convention outlines that the judicial authorities of the contracting 
state shall not decide on the merits of a case until it has been determined a return order should not be 
made.144 An inquiry into harm should not be used as a vehicle to litigate a child's best interests, rather 
these should be dealt with in the eventual custody hearing which ought to occur in the country of 
habitual residence. If the Convention country engages in the merits inquiry, the central issue is it risks 
imposing its own subjective value judgements upon the country of habitual residence.145 
In some situations an inquiry into a child's welfare and best interests is inextricably linked with 
the need to engage in a merits inquiry. Whilst a merits inquiry is undesirable, it is arguable that in 
certain exceptional cases, where there is evidence of violence, perhaps the risk of imposing subjective 
views and threatening comity is justified to protect children. There are certainly some cases where a 
child's unilateral removal is justified and in fact in their best interests.146  
D Consistency with Other Jurisdictions 
Chambers J stressed in White v Northumberland that Hague Convention disputes ought to be 
determined on a uniform international basis.147 The potential implications of allowing inconsistent 
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application has been suggested to result in an undermining of the Convention's core objectives.148 
However, consistency can be a problematic goal, requiring extensive knowledge of overseas practices.  
Despite the importance of international consistency, states have implemented and interpreted the 
Convention in diverse ways. Caldwell indicated that the "most cursory study of overseas jurisdictions 
reveals quite wide national variations in state and judicial practices", most clearly illustrated in the 
"striking divergences in return rates".149 The issue of the treatment of domestic violence victims was 
raised at the last Special Commission, suggesting a growing awareness that a global shift in approach 
is required. As the suggested change in approach still features an inquiry into the adequacy of the 
habitual residence's child protection laws, albeit at a later stage in the proceedings, it is arguably still 
consistent with overseas approaches, though it is relaxing the conventional narrow approach to 
establishing the defence. The earlier section on overseas approaches suggests a change in 
interpretation is already underway in other Convention states. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence cases are of a different nature to the typical paradigm abduction cases which 
the Convention was drafted to remedy. The current judicial approach to s 106(1)(c) in cases of 
domestic violence is unduly narrow, and effectively blocks the exercise of discretion where the child's 
welfare and best interests may be considered. An inquiry which shifts the consideration of the 
adequacy of a habitual residence's protection laws into the exercise of discretion allows all factors to 
be given due consideration, ensuring that the protection of children is paramount.  
This article has briefly contextualised the Convention and considered its implementation in New 
Zealand. It explains how New Zealand and overseas courts have approached the "grave risk" defence 
in cases of domestic violence, critiquing such an approach for blocking the welfare and best interests 
inquiry and failing to adequately protect victims. Drawing authority from case law and the Vienna 
Convention, a shift in the current implementation of the Convention was suggested, and the benefits 
and critiques of this were briefly examined. Whilst there is a risk that the purposes of the Convention 
may be undermined, such a shift in approach would be limited to domestic violence cases, and such 
mischief was not originally contemplated by drafters of the Convention anyway.  
As Lubin stresses, "it is imperative that the Hague Convention remain current to address today's 
trends rather than yesterday's presumptions".150 Contrary to entrenched belief, not all international 
child abduction is inherently harmful. Child victims of domestic violence should not be made to suffer 
for the sake of general deterrence.  
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